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“MIGRATORY BIRD RULE” SHOT DOWN
— by Roger A. McEowen*
In a major decision important to farmers and ranchers with isolated wet areas on their
land or private ponds, the U.S. Supreme court, in early January 2001, reversed the
opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the federal government’s
assertion of jurisdiction over an intrastate wetland pursuant to the so-called “migratory
bird rule” exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act.1
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) makes illegal the discharging of dredge or
fill material into the “navigable waters of the United States” without obtaining a permit
from the Secretary of the Army acting through the Corps of Engineers (COE).  Until
1975, the Corps construed the term “navigable waters” to mean waters that were actually
navigable.  In accordance with regulations promulgated in 1975, the COE expanded its
jurisdiction to “other waters” of the United States, including streams, wetlands, playa
lakes, and natural ponds if the use, degradation or destruction of those areas could affect
interstate commerce.2
 A series of court decisions beginning in the mid-1970s also contributed to the COE’s
increasing jurisdiction over wetlands.3  I  1983, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the term “discharge” may reasonably be understood to include “redeposit” and
concluded that the term “discharge” covered the redepositing of soil taken from wetlands
such as occurs during mechanized land clearing activities.4  In 1987, the COE’s permit
jurisdiction was held to extend to wetlands created by irrigation and flood control
structures.5
Isolated and Nonadjacent Wetlands
Since 1975, the COE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have defined
“waters of the United States” such that the agencies assert regulatory authority over
isolated wetlands or wetlands not adjacent to “waters of the United States” if a link exists
between the waterbody and interstate commerce.6   This int rpretation has been upheld by
the courts.  For example, in 1979, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that COE
jurisdiction exists over all waters, and adjacent wetlands within the COE’s constitutional
reach under the Commerce Clause.7
The “Migratory Bird Rule”
In 1985, an EPA internal memorandum concluded that CWA jurisdiction could be
extended to include isolated wetlands that were or could be used by migratory birds or
endangered species.8  In 1986, the COE issued memoranda to its districts explaining that
the use of waters by migratory birds could support the CWA’s jurisdiction.9  A 1992 case
from the federal district court for North Dakota held that protection of waters utilized
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primarily for bird and wildlife habitat was within the Congress’
intent as expressed in the CWA.10  In this case, the county had
cleared a lengthy drainage ditch through a vast shallow water area
that was frequented by tens of thousands of migratory waterfowl
for feeding, resting and breeding.  The area was also utilized by
interstate travelers for recreation, hunting and bird watching.  The
court held that the isolated wetlands were jurisdictional waters
under the CWA.  However, also in 1992, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the EPA’s regulatory definition of
“other waters” whose destruction could adversely impact
interstate commerce did not include isolated wetlands and was
invalid.11  But, in a highly unusual move, the court granted the
EPA’s petition for a rehearing, vacated its earlier decision and
referred the case to a senior court attorney for settlement
negotiations.12  The court was informed in early 1993 that a
settlement could not be reached.  In a final decision, the court
held that isolated wetlands actually used by migratory birds
presented a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to give
the EPA and COE jurisdiction under the CWA.13  The court held
likewise in a subsequent decision and the Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case.14
The Solid Waste Agency Case
In the case, the plaintiff was a consortium of suburban Chicago
municipalities that selected for a 410-acre solid waste disposal
site a 533-acre abandoned sand and gravel pit containing
excavation trenches that had become permanent and seasonal
ponds.  The ponds and small lakes had become home to
approximately 121 species of birds, including many endangered,
water-dependent, and migratory birds.  Because the proposal for
the site required filling in some of the ponds, the plaintiff
contacted the COE to determine if a landfill permit was required
under Section 404 of the CWA.  The COE, asserting jurisdiction
under the “migratory bird rule,”15 refused to issue a permit in
1991 and 1994, citing a need to protect the habitat of the
migratory birds. When the municipalities challenged the COE’s
jurisdiction, the District Court granted the COE’s motion for
summary judgment,16 and, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that
the Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate intrastate waters and that the “migratory bird rule” was a
reasonable interpretation of the CWA.17
On January 9, 2001, in a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that the “migratory bird
rule” exceeded the authority granted to the COE under §404 of
the CWA.  Accordingly, the Court held that the COE did not have
jurisdiction over ponds that are not adjacent to open water.
Because the Court found the “migratory bird rule” invalid, it did
not address the scope of the CWA’s jurisdiction under the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The court stated that
the “migratory bird rule” raised significant constitutional
questions and would significantly impinge upon traditional states’
power over land and water use.  Since, there was no clear
congressional intent to do so, the court interpreted the act to avoid
raising the constitutional and federalism issues created by the
COE’s interpretation of its jurisdiction.
Impact of the Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision seems to indicate rather strongly
that the COE does not have a legal basis under the CWA to
regulate isolated waters that do not have a substantive connection
to interstate commerce.  While there is perhaps room remaining to
argue over navigability, the opinion does appear to remove federal
jurisdiction over private ponds and seasonal or ephemeral waters
where the only connection with interstate commerce is migratory
waterfowl. Indeed, in early March 2001, the EPA and COE
eliminated their regulatory definition for isolated, solely intrastate
water bodies.
It is also believed that the opinion will have a particularly
significant impact on agricultural activities in the prairie pothole
region of the Dakotas, and other areas that experience seasonal
flooding.
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States Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001), rev’g,
191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999).
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3 See, e.g, United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D.
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Rivers & Harbors Act limitations); United States v. Ashland
Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974)
(CWA held to extend to any tributary of any navigable
stream); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, 392
F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975) (CWA held to extend Section 404
permit jurisdiction to all waters of United States); United
States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762 (2d Cir. 1999) (phrase
“waters of the United States” broadly defined to include
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waterways, and includes
everything from “intrastate lakes” to “prairie potholes”).
4 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897
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Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Mobil Corp., No.
96-CV-1781, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4513 (N.D. N.Y. Mar.
31, 1998) (term “navigable waters” included groundwater
hydrologically connected to surface water such as wetland
with discharge of pollutants therein requiring permit).
7 United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (Corps
has jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to inland lakes if lakes
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“Clean Water Act jurisdiction over isolated waters.”  See also,
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
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U.S. Corps of Engineers (Commerce Clause jurisdiction in
isolated waters, Feb. 11, 1986).
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potential or minimal connection to interstate commerce).
14 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 2003 (2000).
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CONVERSION. The debtor was an agricultural cooperative
which filed for Chapter 11. During the case, the debtor liquidated
all business assets, terminated all employees and ceased business
activities. The debtor did have a pending lawsuit against a former
manager for embezzlement. The debtor claimed that if the
lawsuit produced the claimed damages, the money would be
sufficient for the debtor to restart the business. The debtor did not
provide any evidence of the chances of success in the lawsuit or
that the claimed damages could be recovered, even if awarded.
The court held that the case would be converted to Chapter 7
because of the uncertain future of the debtor and the lack of
ongoing business or employees to protect through Chapter 11. In
re Orienta Co-op. Ass’n, 256 B.R. 508 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The debtors filed for Chapter 13 in
April 1998. The IRS received notice of the filing and filed a
claim for unpaid taxes. The debtors filed post-petition amended
returns for 1991 through 1996 which claimed no income and
requested refund of all taxes. In September 1998, the IRS
rejected the amended returns as frivolous and assessed a penalty
of $500 for each return. In November 1998, the IRS mailed the
debtors a Form 6335 which again claimed the frivolous return
penalty. In December 1998, the IRS sent the debtors a Notice of
Intent to Levy. After contact from the debtors’ attorney, the IRS
placed a hold on their account and stopped all collection effort.
The court held that the Notice of Intent to Levy was a willful
violation of the automatic stay. The debtors claimed emotional
distress injury from the IRS actions and the court held that the
debtors were entitled to $1000 in damages for emotional distress
personal injury. In re Covington, 256 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D. S.C.
2000).
DISCHARGE . The IRS has issued a Chief Counsel Notice
which states that an I.R.C. § 6404(c) abatement of a taxpayer’s
tax liability does not require a new assessment in order to
increase the tax liability. A Section 6404(c) abatement occurs
when the IRS has determined that a properly assessed tax
liability has become more costly to collect than the amount of the
tax collectable. Section 6404(c) abatements can occur during a
bankruptcy case where the debtor has insufficient assets to cover
a tax liability secured by a tax lien. However, if the tax is not
paid, the tax lien is not extinguished in the bankruptcy case, and
if the debtor is later found to have sufficient assets subject to the
lien, the IRS ruled that it has the authority to increase the
debtor’s tax assessment without issuing a new assessment,
because the Section 6404(c) abatement does not characterize the
original assessment as improper, just financially unreasonable to
collect. CC-2001-014.
TAX LIEN . The debtor failed to file or pay federal income
taxes for several years and the IRS filed a tax lien for its
estimation of the taxes owed. The debtor argued that the debtor
was not subject to any federal tax because the debtor was a
“natural sovereign individual” or “freeman.” The court held that
the debtor, as a resident citizen of the United States was subject
to federal income taxation; therefore, the assessed taxes were
sufficient to support the tax lien. In re Lesonik, 256 B.R. 441
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2000).
CONRACTS
ARBITRATION CLAUSE . The debtor was a farmer and had
entered into several hedge-to-arrive contracts with a grain
cooperative. The debtor defaulted on three of the contracts and
the cooperative demanded damages from the debtor. The
contracts contained provisions requiring arbitration before the
National Grain & Feed Ass’n (NGFA). The debtor refused to
submit to arbitration and the cooperative obtained a state court
order forcing arbitration. In the arbitration proceeding the debtor
claimed that the contracts were void as illegal off-exchange
futures contracts. The arbitrators ruled that the contracts were
valid cash forward contracts and awarded damages to the
cooperative. The debtor filed for bankruptcy and the cooperative
filed a claim for the damage award. In the bankruptcy case, the
debtor attempted to attack the validity of the arbitration
proceeding as biased because of the predominance of grain
dealers on the arbitration panel. The court held that the debtor
failed to provide sufficient evidence of bias in the arbitration
process. The court also held that the arbitration award was due
preclusive effect, barring the Bankruptcy Court from relitigating
the validity of the contracts. In re Robinson, 256 B.R. 482
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).
